Opposition in Parliamentary Democracies:
British and Japanese Political Parties in Comparison

Takako Imai*

Abstract

Participation and legitimate opposition are two central features of what Robert Dahl identified as polyarchies. Despite normative emphases on the importance of political opposition for 'more' democracy, studies of opposition parties are yet to flourish. By comparing the British Labour Party and the Democratic Party of Japan, this paper will explore the way in which the practice of a political party in opposition has an impact on the party's performance once in government. Both Britain and Japan are known to be parliamentary democracies, experiencing an alternation of power by landslide: Britain in 1997 and Japan in 2009. However, the Labour government in Britain and the coalition government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) showed a remarkable difference in their abilities to put their election manifestoes into practice, as well as in their courses of policy position after they took power. To understand the discrepancy between the Labour Party and the DPJ in their performances in government, this paper will argue that the power resources provided for the party leadership, and the intra-party decision-making system, both of which are set during the years in opposition, define, to a significant extent, the strength of the political leadership once in government.

Substantial inequalities, serious conflicts of interest, and legitimate divergences of opinion were real and intense. Under such conditions, conflict is not only inevitable, it is virtue in democratic politics, for it is conflict combined with consent, not consent alone, which preserves democracy from eroding into oligarchy.

Moses I. Finley (1985: 73)

---

* Professor, Faculty of Law, Seikei University
  E-mail: takako-imai@law.seikei.ac.jp

I.   Parties in government, parties in opposition[1]

1. Why the opposition matters

Participation and legitimate opposition are the central features of what Robert Dahl identified as polyarchies. In his seminal work on political oppositions, Dahl placed 'the virtue of dissent, of *opposing',* at the centre stage of the democratic political system (Dahl 1966). Despite normative emphases on the importance of political opposition, so far there have been limited studies of opposition parties. Recently, Helms and others have re-examined the parliamentary opposition in different political, institutional and cultural settings (Helms 2008). Following Dahl's theme, what Helms confirmed was that 'there can be no real democracy without opposition' (Helms 2008: 6).

According to Helms, there is a broad agreement on the functions of the opposition, which is to scrutinise and check governmental actions as well as policies, and represent a credible alternative government (Helms 2008: 9). In essence, this paper focuses on this last function of the opposition as an alternative government. Under parliamentary democracies, since legislative and executive powers can combine, the executives hold enormous power within it. Thus, effective roles of the opposition and the constant alternation of government are the crucial factor to limit the power of the executives.

2. Comparing the oppositions under parliamentary democracy

Britain is widely known to have an official opposition with a capital 'O', namely His/Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition. The underlying assumption of the British political system is, therefore, that the 'Opposition' is the credible alternative of the government and that two major political parties have alternated in office (King 1992: 223). In other words, the electoral pendulum is a critical part of the constitution.

The swing halted, however, when the Labour Party lost four elections in a row from 1979 to 1992. As Anthony King claims, the British party system in 1992 came to be seen as what Sartori calls a "predominant-party system" like Japan; that is, 'one in which a single party both controls an absolute majority of seats in the legislature and is able to govern on its own, without the need of coalition partners, for a prolonged period of time' (King 1992: 224). In 1997, the Labour party led by Tony Blair took office by a landslide victory. The electoral pendulum had been swung again.

In Japan, under the 1955 system in which the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter referred to as LDP) played a dominant role until the 1990s, the only possible function the opposition was to oppose (Nonaka 2011: 267). Modelled on Britain, political reforms implemented in the 1990s, which introduced the first-past-the-post system combined with proportional representation system, paved the way for the opposition to be a potential governmental party. In September 2009, after the general election, the

---

Democratic Party of Japan (hereafter refered to as DPJ) won by a historical landslide. The electoral pendulum, assumingly, began to swing in Japan.

By comparing the British Labour Party and the DPJ, this paper will explore the way in which the power resources and the policy making system established during the years in opposition influences the policy development once the opposition party takes office. In order to clarify the argument, the paper will then compare the first years of the Labour government and those of the DPJ government, since it was the only period in which the DPJ government controlled the majority in the upper house with the cooperation of two minority parties.

Both suffered an inferior position against a dominant incumbent governmental party for a long period of time. Even though the Japanese electoral arrangement is a mixture of two different systems, the major battleground for the parties is the single-sheet constituency. Before the election, both faced the dilemma in defining their goals between vote seeking and policy seeking. Furthermore, both were required to respond to the public demands for reforming public services so as to tackle the needs raised in the era of the post-welfare state. Finally, both won the election by a historical landslide, for Labour in 1997, and for the DPJ in 2009.

Despite these similarities, their performance in office showed remarkable discrepancies. It has been widely acknowledged that during the first few years in office, when implementing its manifesto, the Labour government ran the economy within a strictly prudent framework. Despite fierce criticisms from inside and outside of the party, tight control of public spending helped to establish the credibility and competence of the government in the financial market, which was seen as a 'priceless political advantage' (Annesley and Gamble 2004: 144). At the same time, the Labour government was able to swiftly put other key election pledges into practice such as the New Deal programme which was funded by the so-called 'windfall tax'.

It is worth noting that, after Labour took power, it shifted its policy position towards the left, in comparison with the position proposed in its election manifesto (Bara 2001). For example, the Labour government managed to target welfare spending 'towards the poorest people of non-working age, such as children and pensioners, and at two public policy areas with universal programmes: education and health' (Annesley and Gamble 2004: 145). A series of these targeted policies and universal public services had had, though substantially modest in their objectives, effects of redistribution. However, it appeared that the Labour government was reluctant to claim the 'credit' for those redistributive policies. M. Rhodes describes this as 'taxation and redistribution by stealth' (Rhodes 2000: 59-60)[2].

Why was the Labour Party able to put its election manifesto into practice so swiftly? Secondly, why did the Labour Party change its policy position stated in the manifesto

---

[2] Annesley and Gamble point out that the Labour government engaged in a peculiar strategy of "credit avoidance" (Annesley and Gamble 2004: 157). The behaviour of the Labour government neither fits to the conventional explanation of 'credit seeking' at the time of developing a welfare state, nor 'blame avoidance' during the era of welfare retrenchment (Weaver 1986). Although the Labour government became less reluctant to mention redistribution through taxation and other policies, their unconventional behaviour of 'credit avoidance' never disappeared.

after the election? Thirdly, why did it not claim the 'credit' in public for such changes? I shall return to these points in the latter part of this section.

In the case of the DPJ, despite the landslide victory at the 2009 general election, and the manifesto that openly (i.e. not by stealth) stated redistribution and universalism, the coalition government led by the DPJ, from almost the beginning of the first term, had much difficulty in submitting to Diet the bills proposed in its manifesto. The DPJ did carry out some of the key policies, such as free tuition fees for all high school students and income guarantees to the farmers. However, the coalition government was not able to implement such key policies as toll-free motorways or the abolition of a provisional petrol tax rate. At the same time, even though it enforced the universal child allowance, a flagship policy in its manifesto, not only the opposition parties but also the leading members of the DPJ insisted on abandoning universalism by introducing means tests to the allowance. It appeared that while at the time of the election, the DPJ offered a generous cash distribution, much of which was to be provided universally, after it took office its position became inconsistent with the manifesto.

Why was the DPJ unable to achieve the policy goals presented in its manifesto? And why did the policy position of the DPJ become so inconsistent once it was in government?

One might argue that because, unlike the Labour Party, the DPJ had to form a coalition government with two small parties to secure a majority in the upper house (the House of Councillors), it had difficulties to implement the policies offered in its election manifesto. It is true that both coalition partners argued against the universalism applied to child allowance. Yet, the coalition partners were not the sole obstacles for the DPJ. Rather, a considerable lack of information about the machinery as well as the financial situation of the government, and the absence of shared ideas or logic beyond the slogan ('putting people's lives first') within the DPJ badly affected the policy development after inauguration.

To summarise, I shall argue that the resources available to the leadership of the opposition party, and the intra-party policy making system, both of which are established during the years in opposition, define the ability of the opposition (or the government-in-waiting) to put their manifestos into practice, and the party's policy position in government.

II. Framework of the discussion: resources of the opposition party, party goals, and the 'policy design'

1. Exogenous factors that promote/constrain the party leadership

The ability of the party leaders to identify the direction of the party to take is constrained by numerous factors. Therefore, the degree of their discretion is contingent on exogenous and endogenous factors. To examine the opposition parties of both countries I shall first refer to these factors which condition the discretion of the party

leadership. Here, exogenous factors include such institutional settings as conventions particularly arranged to support the opposition parties. Regarding endogenous factors, I shall examine the policy-making system of the opposition, particularly the way of coordinating different ideas and interests within the party.

2. Goals of a party

As mentioned above, the party leaders are not always free to assert the course of the party. To analyse what goals the party defines, I shall focus on three sets of the party goals presented by Strøm and Müller. They illustrate party goals and patterns of behaviour as follows: office seeking, policy seeking, and vote seeking (Strøm and Müller 1999). These goals are not always compatible one another, and instead often challenged by trade-offs.

First of all, an office-seeking party is one which maximises 'their control over political office benefits' through appointments of the positions within the government and sub-government. The proponents of this office-seeking thesis argue against Downs' model, which views the paramount of the party goal as vote maximisation.

Secondly, regarding the policy-seeking party, it is illustrated as primarily seeking to maximise its impact on public policy. Namely, such parties aim at changing public policy towards its desirable directions. Windows of opportunities are usually not widely open to the party leaders. But policy-seeking parties tend to presume that party leaders, either driven from instrumental values or ideological commitment, can identify and differentiate between the 'gains and losses' of the policies within the limited windows of opportunities (Strøm and Müller 1999: 9).

Thirdly, the concept of the vote-seeking party is derived from the so-called Downs' model. The model presumes that parties seek to maximise their electoral support to control the government. In Downs' famous formation, 'parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies' (Strøm and Müller 1999: 8-9).

As mentioned above, it could be assumed that in the single-seat constituencies electoral system, the rational choice of the opposition is to act as vote seeking at the expense of radical policy alternatives. Yet, this paper argues that the means to mitigate the dilemma of the party goals is not solely defined by the exogenous constrains, but by autonomous choices made by the party leadership. Accordingly, it presupposes that the goal(s) is/are defined, to a considerable degree, through discretion of the party leadership, and that the ways in which the goal(s) is/are decided while in opposition certainly affects the policy development once the opposition takes office.

3. Policy design

A policy design offered in the manifesto could be seen as integral to the ideas and strategy of the party. In order to examine the policy design of the party, I shall focus on the policy areas of the so-called 'welfare-to-work', which has became a pivotal area in the

context of the reordering of the welfare system.

'Welfare to work' is typically distinguished into two types, 'workfare' and 'activation'. 'Workfare' and 'activation' share three basic elements. First, both prioritise a policy that intervenes in the supply-side, shifting away from Keynesian demand-side policy. Second, both put emphasis on 'active' policies seeking to protect against contingent risks of life. Typical examples of this are a series of active labour market policies, which involve individual guidance, job brokerage, training to improve one's employability, and so forth. Third, entitlement to certain social benefits come to be conditional as both workfare and activation usually attaches the obligation to work or other work-oriented obligation. Since workfare and activation attach importance to work, they are both distinguished from basic income, namely guaranteed minimum income, which is paid to all citizens without qualification. Diverse in policy contents as it may be, it appears that most OECD countries, apart from Japan, have applied some kind of 'welfare to work' policies (OECD 2007)[3].

On the other hand, workfare and activation can be distinguished in at least two ways: the degree of guaranteed de-commodification, and the commitment by the government to intervene in the demand-side. Regarding the former, as Peck points out, at the heart of workfare is a view of enforcing benefit (welfare) recipients to work by imposing a range of compulsory programmes and mandatory requirements on them (Peck 2001: 10). It breaks away from the principle of the post-war welfare state, which had facilitated eligibility-based claims on welfare entitlements. Inevitably, the degree of decommodification is law under workfarism as in the USA. Depending on the strictness of the penalties and the scale of the services provided for the job seekers, workfare is also divided into work-first and service intensive models. Regarding the latter point, intervention in the demand-side, workfare usually does not include either the public policies to stimulate or expand employment, or to secure 'decent work' through regulations for employment protection.

In contrast, activation designates the programmes and measures 'intended to activate people receiving social allowances, or in danger of being excluded from the labour market, in order to make them enter or re-enter the labour market or engage in work-oriented activities' (Aerschot 2011: 3). A typical example of this is the policy design applied in Nordic countries. It puts emphasis not only on active labour market policies, but also on the provision of various services for those outside the labour market (Miyamoto 2006). Thus, activation typically includes the policies to intervene in the demand-side, such as creating jobs in the public sector. The differences between the two are not trivial. Rather, it dramatically affects the life-course of the individuals.

Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the policy design for 'welfare to work'. Figure 1 shows that 'welfare to work' is composed of a set of policies in different areas, such as public assistance outside the labour market, job assistance and penalties for those who

---

[3] In 2006, spending on active labour market policies by the Japanese government was about one third of the OECD average (0.25 % of GDP in 2006, while the OECD average was 0.64%) (OECD 2008).

seek jobs, policies to make work pay, policies to achieve decent work, and policies to create and maintain jobs. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate typical patterns of workfare and activation. The variation of colours indicates that the darker the colour, the more emphasis is placed on that policy area. For example, activation attaches greater importance to job creation than workfare. Finally, Figure 4 elucidates the policy position that a party takes.


Figure 1: A Policy Design for Welfare-to-Work

Job creation maintenance

Public Assistance outside the Labour Market

· Income guarantees
· care services
· pre-school education
· vocational education/ lifelong learning
· asset-building assistance (i.e. child trust fund)

Decent work

· employment protection
· equal treatment

The Labour Market

Make Work Pay

· Minimum wage
· Tax credits

Penalties

Obligation to work, or work related activities
Cutting benefits for non-compliance

Job assistance
Duration of training, options for the participants,
A personal adviser, Income assistance, supports for case, etc.

Source: Imai 2011b.

Figure 2: A Policy Design for Workfare

Job creation maintenance

Public Assistance outside the Labour Market

· Income guarantees
· care services
· pre-school education
· vocational education/ lifelong learning
· asset-building assistance (i.e. child trust fund)

Decent work

· employment protection
· equal treatment

The Labour Market

Make Work Pay

· Minimum wage
· Tax credits

Penalties

Obligation to work, or work related activities
Cutting benefits for non-compliance

Job assistance
Duration of training, options for the participants,
A personal adviser, Income assistance, supports for case, etc.

Source: Imai 2011b.

Figure 3: A Policy Design for Activation

Public assistance* (+)

Activation

Work
imperatives
(-)

Work
imperatives
(+)

Basic Income

（**Workfare: Service Intensive**）

Workfare

（**Workfare: Workfirst**）

*social
benefits
+ service
provision

Public assistance (-)

Source: Miyamoto 2006.

Figure 4: The Party's Policy Position (workfare, activation, basic income)

III. Comparative analysis: the case of the British Labour Party

In this section, I will briefly summarise two sets of factors that extend or constrain the autonomy of the party leadership (Sections 1, 2). In other words, these two factors comprise a significant part of the power resources available to the party leadership. In Sections 3 and 4, I shall examine the process of drafting and finalising the election manifesto before the 1997 general election. In this way, this paper tries to illustrate how the party leader sets a party goal and how the establishment of a certain goal affects the policy design presented in the manifesto. I shall then discuss how the experiences during the years in opposition influence the performance of the government once the opposition takes office.

1. Exogenous factors: institutional settings

In Britain, there are measures and conventions that particularly support the opposition parties so as to promote it to be a credible alternative to the existing government. Amongst them, Douglas-Home Rules and Short Money are notable examples.

Firstly, Douglas-Home Rules are the conventions that enable the leaders and the leading spokesmen of the opposition to contact senior civil servants prior to an election. Since 1992, it has allowed contacts to take place up to about 16 months before an

election. The underlying assumption of the convention is that the opposition leaders can discuss with senior officials only on organisation and machinery of the government, and department officials should not give advice to the opposition spokesmen before an election. However, as Riddell and Haddon put, 'the official focus on the organisation and machinery of government contains ambiguities and is too restrictive' (Riddell and Haddon 2009). Since it is conducted with the discretion of the officials, there are possibilities that the talks between the shadow spokesmen and senior officials in reality go beyond the 'machinery of government'. For example, if a Permanent Secretary acknowledges that the policy proposed by the minister-in-waiting is going in the wrong direction, instead of giving 'advice', he 'raises questions' to the opposition spokesman so as to implicitly warn of the pitfalls ahead (Riddell and Haddon 2009: 22).

Blair once recalled, in his 2004 speech on reforming the civil service, that after Douglas-Home Rules came into force, he could have contact with Cabinet Secretaries, Robin Butler and Richard Wilson, which effectively eased the way for the transition (David Richards 2009: 108). His remarks prove that the rules, at least to a certain extent, bridged huge gaps in experiences and knowledge between Labour and the incumbent Conservative government.

Secondly, Short Money, introduced in 1975 with the initiative of Edward Short, the then-leader of the House of Commons, is the public financial aid to all opposition parties in the Commons. Since then, the opposition leaders receive substantial sums of additional money from the government. It assists them to carry out their parliamentary business by covering their travel expenses or the running costs of the opposition leaders' office. Allocation is based on the results of the previous general election (Kelly 2011).

Short Money can work as a part of power resources for the party leadership because it is paid to the parliamentary party, not to the party headquarters. Thus, the party leadership allocates money without much interference from the party. It was lucky for Blair that the amendment was made to increase the amount of Short Money a year before he became the Labour leader. Accordingly, it enabled him to hire such personal advisers as David Miliband, Alastair Campbell and many others.

2. Endogenous factors: The policy-making system and autonomy of the leadership of New Labour

There are at least three characteristics of the leadership structure of the Labour Party before the 1997 general election.

Firstly, it was centralised by concentrating the decision-making power on the top executives of the PLP, namely the shadow cabinet and the leader's office. Yet, even though the decision-making system of the party became centralised, it did not necessarily guarantee the coherence of the inner core elite. As put forward in the next section, there were divisions both in the shadow cabinet and even between Blair and the shadow chancellor, Gordon Brown, over the values that the party should embrace.

Secondly, there was considerable lack of consultation amongst the shadow cabinet and within the inner core elites (Gould 1998: 245; Short 2005: 50). Lack of consultation

was witnessed at the horizontal level amongst the members of the shadow cabinet, as well as the vertical level between the leader's office or shadow chancellor's office and the shadow cabinet. While the leader's office tried to control the public statements made by the members of the shadow cabinet, discussions over crucial matters were often made exclusively by the leader's office and that of the shadow chancellor.

Thirdly, even though there were divisions and a lack of communication within the leading spokesmen, the official process of the party to build a consensus across the party provided the election manifesto with legitimacy. The deliberation on the draft manifesto at the National Policy Forum, which involved the representatives from all sections of the party, and the resolution at the party conference, were the key mechanism for it (Quinn 2004). Before the 1996 party conference, Blair and Tom Sawyer, the then-general secretary, enthusiastically encouraged individual members of the party to cast their votes at the party conference. Their aim was to gain overwhelming approval for the proposed manifesto. As a result, the draft manifesto was approved by 95 per cent of the votes (although the turnout was just above 60 per cent) (Imai 2011a).

3. Analysing the policy-making process of the Labour Party: drafting the manifesto

While drafting the manifesto, fierce debates took place within the shadow cabinet. The debates focused on whether the party would prioritise vote seeking to policy seeking, as well as whether it would apply workfare or activation. Along with this, they fiercely argued over choices between universalism and selectivism, and between redistribution or denial of progressive taxation.

In retrospect, the Labour Party under the leadership of John Smith attempted to mitigate the dilemma between vote seeking and policy seeking. The policy design offered in *Social Justice*, issued by the Commission on Social Justice in 1994, was based more on the idea of activation. While criticising the 'American' model workfare, *Social Justice* put much emphasis on relatively generous active labour market policies, such as Intermediate Labour Market programme practiced in Scotland. It also included policies to create jobs in the service sector, to protect employment, and to provide universal child benefit (Commission on Social Justice 1994).

When Blair became the Labour leader in July 1994, he tried to make the party electable again, redirecting the party goal towards vote seeking. The changes in the direction of the party occurred gradually. It is interesting to note that in 1995 the draft manifesto, *A New Economic Future for Britain*, which was to be adopted at the 1995 party conference, explicitly stated, along with supply-side policies, the policies of job creation for a 'full employment society' as well as employment protection (Labour Party 1995: 53, 63-66). Therefore, arguably, at this stage, Labour had not yet abandoned the policy design in favour of activation.

Immediately after the 1995 conference, however, Brown initiated a shift towards workfare. He announced, without prior negotiation in the party, that Labour would prepare or introduce penalties for noncompliance of the New Deal programme, which

was regarded as one of the flagship policies in the manifesto. Brown's proposal intended to punish the work-shy by cutting benefits if participants did not take any of the options offered by the government. Chris Smith, the then-shadow secretary for social security, intensely attacked Brown for shifting the party policy design towards the coercive workfare (*The Guardian,* 9 November 1995; Bower 2005: 168). Despite the dissent within the shadow cabinet, Brown's proposal became one of the core elements of the New Deal programme.

Following the inner turmoil triggered by Brown, the leader's office sought restlessly the 'ground idea' that could integrate vote seeking and policy seeking goals. On 8 January 1996, Blair eloquently advocated the 'stakeholding economy', which he and his inner circle expected to become a 'ground idea'.

When Blair made his speech on the stakeholder economy in Singapore on 8 January 1996, he presented his moral commitment to the idea of a inclusive society in which reciprocal relation amongst all stakeholders such as employers and employees work in trust. It not only had an element of vote seeking, which was clearly shown by the repeatedly used words 'One Nation', but also attached great importance to policy seeking based on the idea of a 'stakeholding society'.

However, only a week after the speech, the Conservatives, the business, the financial sector and the media attacked Blair's commitment to a stakeholding society (*The Financial Times,* 13, 19, January 1996; *The Sun,* 16, 24 January 1996). Despite this, Will Hutton, the original advocator of a 'stakeholding society', praised Blair's attempt. Yet, faced with harsh criticism, Blair immediately went back on it by claiming 'it is only a slogan' (*The Financial Times,* 15, 16, January 1996).

It was after the withdrawal of the 'stakeholder economy' that the party launched the drafting manifesto, *Road to Manifesto* (Blair 1996; Brown 1996). As shown below, in this process, the leader's office became even more defensive, trying to avoid policies that could generate criticism particularly from *The Sun* or *The Daily Mirror* of which major readers were so-called 'Middle England': the significant floating voters.

While drafting the manifesto throughout the year of 1996, the decision making process had become more exclusive to the leader's office and that of the shadow chancellor. In January 1996, two factors strengthened the party leadership. On the one hand, the Milibank with powerful election planning machinery was set up, and on the other, Dagulas-Home Rules came into force (Seldon 2005: 300; Riddell and Haddon 2009). Particularly for the latter, Brown and his close adviser Ed Balls started to make contact with the Treasury around 16 months before the 1997 election, although they concealed many of the core policies such as the independence of the Bank of England. In addition, David Blunkett, the then-shadow secretary for education and employment, met the relevant Permanent Secretary, Sir Michael Bichard, every six weeks or so. According to Riddell and Haddon, through regular contacts they built up a close personal relationship, which became one of the keys to the successful implementation of such flagship policies of the manifesto as the literacy and numeracy programme and the New Deal programme (Riddell and Haddon 2009: 43).

Both Milibank and the contacts with senior officials provided extended, though not sufficient, information, which became power resources for the leadership. Under these circumstances, Labour narrowed down its policy objectives by repositioning itself from universalism to selectivism, and from redistributive to less progressive, resulting in the policy design of workfare[4].

4. 'A policy of no change': The final decision on redistribution

However, there was a crucial issue that *Road to Manifesto* did not address: the progressivity of income tax. At the 1996 party conference, Blair had already ruled out altogether any possibility of raising income tax (Jones 1997: 75; Bower 2004: 189; Ashdown 2000: 485-487; Keegan 2004: 139-49). By doing this, Blair intended to avoid controversies on taxation that would divide the party.

After the party conference, the negotiation over taxation took place solely between the leader's office and that of the shadow chancellor. As shown in footnote 4, Brown was not keen on universalism, and instead he wanted to achieve redistribution through progressive taxation. He proposed a 50p rate on earnings over £100,000. Blair resisted the proposal on the ground that it could severely risk the party's electoral opportunity.

The final decision was made on 5 January, 1997. Participants of the talk were Blair, Brown and their close advisers (Campbell and Stott 2007: 145). Essentially, Brown and Balls insisted on more progressivity. Brown emphasised that his plan was legitimate in that, according to the polls, around 70 per cent of the respondents were willing to pay more tax, should it lead to better public services. Blair tried to convince Brown to withdraw his plan by citing Philip Gould's focus group research results which showed the opposite of Brown's conclusion (Gould 1998: 289; Blair 2010: 116). Blair's idea was that, for electoral advantage, the party should stick to the level of taxation set by the Conservative government; central to his strategy was 'a policy of no change'. At the last moment, Brown was forced to withdraw his plan (*The Financial Times,* 9 January 1997; Campbell and Stott 2007: 145-147; Keegan 2002:148). Consequently, Labour's policy position was shifted as shown in Figure 5.

---

[4] To give an example, on 20 April 1996, Brown announced his plan to abolish the universal child benefit for sixteen-to-eighteen-year olds. Extra money brought by the abolishment, about £0.7 billion, was to be allocated to a means-tested allowance for the poorest children attending full-time education (*The Observer,* 21 April 1996). Prior to the announcement, Brown did not communicate either with Campbell, who was in charge of the press release, or other relevant shadow spokesmen (Bower 2005: 170). Despite the harsh attacks from inside the party, *Road to Manifesto* included Brown's proposal (Labour Party 1996; Bower 2005: 170).

Public assistance* (+)

Activation

Labour 1994

Work
imperatives
(-)

Work
imperatives
(+)

Basic Income

The Labour
gov 1997-

Labour1997
manifesto

Workfare

（**Workfare: Service Intensive**）

（**Workfare: Workfirst**）

*social
benefits
+ service
provision

Public assistance (-)

Source: Miyamoto 2006.

Figure 5: The Policy Position of the Labour Party, in 1994 and 1997

To summarise, the Labour party prioritised a vote-seeking goal to policy-seeking before the election. Although the party at the centre was divided in its view, particularly between the leader and the shadow chancellor, the leader's view utterly prevailed right before the election. This was possible only because the leader could enjoy discretion resulting from the highly-centralised and exclusive decision-making system as well as from new recourses, such as contacts with senior civil servants and financial assistance which the leaders of the opposition have at their disposal.

The policy design drawn from vote seeking goals was to have an effect on the policy development after the party took office. In short, the 'policy of no change' forced the party to narrow down the policy objectives, and thus, when it tried to implement some radical reforms, they always had to be done 'by stealth'.

IV. The Democratic Party of Japan

1. The state of the country and policy ideas before the 2009 election

To start with, it should be helpful to elucidate the state of Japan before the historical change of government in 2009. Before the credit crunch hit the world economy in 2008, Japan had already been in the midst of a prolonged downturn of the economy since the 1990s. In the middle of 2009, the LDP government admitted that the slump in the Japanese economy was the most severe amongst all the advanced industrialised

countries. General government gross financial liabilities were accumulated to 170. 3 per cent of nominal GDP (projected in 2008 by OECD) (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs 2008: 68). Not only the economy, but also the welfare state, to the extent that it existed in Japan, was under serious threat.

With regard to the welfare state, under the long-lasting LDP governments since 1955, the livelihood security system[5] in Japan was heavily dependent on a rigid male breadwinner model. Under this system, the government was allowed to save expenditure on social securities especially for children and people of working age because these were taken care of by families. Instead, the government concentrated spending on securing employment through regulations and public-work projects so as to guarantee life-time employment, family wages, and fringe benefits for male employees who supported their full-time housewives, children, and quite often their parents. Under this system, social benefits were seen to be residual and there was a serious lack of service provisions from the government because families were expected to supply care for children and the aged.

Obviously, such a livelihood security system of the post-war era appeared to be unsustainable once the labour market shrank and the sweeping relaxation of labour regulation was promoted. By the mid-1990s, the system of the post-war era was unable to cope with the new social risks[6].

While serious distrust in the political system as a whole, including existing parties, politicians, and bureaucrats, spread over the society, 58.4 per cent of the people still wanted a 'welfare state' with a Scandinavian standard (Yamaguchi and Miyamoto 2008). Against emerging pressure, the LDP governments led by Hashimoto (January 1996-July 1998), and then by Koizumi (April 2001-September 2006) attempted pro-market reforms based on the idea of workfare, without much success (Miyamoto 2003: 13). Such reforms were criticised for widening income inequalities and an increasing instability of employment.

With neoliberal reforms generating criticism, policy ideas based on activation slowly gained support from political elites across the parties and civil servants. In 2005, the DPJ presented a manifesto for the general election, which proposed policies based on activation. It put forward the universal child allowance coupled with various service provisions. At that point, the DPJ acknowledged that income support through cash distribution and delivering services were both necessary (DPJ 2005). This was a clear turn from the idea of the conventional livelihood system.

However, the DPJ was soundly defeated in the 2005 election, and the Koizumi government continued to promote pro-market reforms enthusiastically, which was

---

[5] The term 'livelihood system' refers to the totality of economic and social structures involved in economic production, distribution and consumption, as it relates to the livelihood of individuals (Osawa 2011: 2).

[6] Looking back at the state that Japan was in at the time of the 2009 election, it was already the oldest society in the world. While the expected rate of people aged 65 or over against the whole population was 22.5 in 2010, the fertility rate was only 1.29 (2005), one of the lowest amongst the OECD countries (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs 2009). Japan had been one of the lowest spenders of social expenditure (17.7 % over GDP in 2003) next to the USA (16.2 % over GDP), which was actually a much younger society than Japan (for the USA, the expected elderly rate of 2010 was 12.9).

succeeded by the Abe government in 2006. In contrast, criticising the government's workfare reforms, the DPJ under a new party leader, Ichiro Ozawa, placed more emphasis on cash distribution, gradually shifting away from activation. In 2007, at the election for the upper house, the DPJ gained enough seats to win the majority with cooperation from other small parties, which led to the 'twisted parliament'.

In response to the crises of the economy and the government itself, the LDP government also marched towards activation. In April 2009, with Prime Minister Aso in attendance, the LDP government launched a special panel to discuss the reforms of the livelihood system, in particular, how to realise a 'secured society'. It is worth noting that the final reports of the panel proposed a 'secured society based on stable employment', grounded on the idea of activation. Despite efforts to reverse the grave distrust in the government and to cultivate the public expectation for better public services, support for Taro Aso in the polls, the last prime minster of the outgoing coalition government led by LDP, continued to fall to less than 20 points in July 2009, one month before the general election.

On 30 August 2009, the DPJ won by a landslide and achieved an historical change of government. DPJ won 64.2 per cent of the total seats (308 out of 512 seats), which marked the highest share in Diet since World War II. Despite a huge majority in the lower house, DPJ still had to form a coalition government with two small parties in order to acquire the majority in the upper house.

2. The institutional setting
(1) Political reforms in 1994

Under the 1955 system in which the LDP played a dominant role, there was no such institutional setting to support the transition of the government. Therefore, the opposition parties had limited access to financial, informational, and network resources. Asymmetry in power resources between the ruling party and the opposition was overwhelming.

In 1994, the government introduced the combined electoral system of single-seat constituencies and proportional representation, replacing multiple-seat constituencies, and public subsidies to the parties. The political reforms paved the way for the opposition parties to overcome a massive inferiority in the power resources to the dominant party. This enabled the opposition parties, almost for the first time, to realistically expect the alternation of the government (Nonaka 2011: 273).

(2) The lack of institutional settings for transition

As discussed above, the Labour Party took advantage of the Douglas-Home Rules while drafting the manifesto. In Japan, however, there is no formal rule to allow the opposition leaders to have contact with senior civil servants, especially with cabinet secretaries.

Yet, the MPs of the opposition can meet civil servants when they prepare a private member's bill, or investigate the bills submitted by the government. A senior member

of staff at the DPJ headquarters testified to the author that, for the MPs of the DPJ, the usual counterparts from the departments were limited to the heads of each section[7]. However, since the DPJ commanded a majority in the upper house in 2007, directors of departments were willing to contact them. Despite that, there was still an obvious lack of information resources, particularly regarding public finances. Arguably, such deficiency in information led the DPJ to be rather optimistic about their funding plans. What the DPJ discovered after inauguration was a serious underfunding, due to which they were forced to review many of their key policies stated in the manifesto.

(3) Bicameralism

The opposition in Japan has few, if any, devices to exert their influence on the legislative process. The Japanese polity operates a bicameral system in which the first chamber is the more powerful one in legislative politics. Yet a powerful second chamber, which can function as a veto point for the government, has repercussions on opposition politics (Kaiser 2008: 23). In addition, if the upper house issues a censure motion typically initiated by the opposition, though not legally binding, because it works closely with repudiation of deliberation in Diet, it can inflict major damage to the government as it often leads to resignation of the minister being motioned.

As the electoral system for the upper house is a mixture of single-seat constituency, proportional representation, and multiple-seat constituency systems, it tends to bring some advantages to the opposition parties. Thus, the opposition is often better represented in the upper house than the first. Since the downturn of the LDP, no party had a clear-cut majority in either chamber since 1989 (Nonaka 2011), which was why coalition governments became prevalent in Japanese politics.

In the 2007 upper house election, the DPJ won more seats than any other party by gaining 28 amongst 242 seats under contest. However, as it still did not control the majority of the upper house, the DPJ formed a coalition with two small parties to set up a government. In doing so, the DPJ secured a majority in both houses with its coalition partners, which ended in July 2010 when they were defeated in the upper house election.

3. The party organisation and policy-making system of the DJP[8]

The major characteristics of the organisation of the DPJ are three-fold; first of all, from its origin it is the party of aggregation, and thus the values and policies of the members tend to be fragmented (Nonaka 2011: 291). Since its establishment in 1998, the DPJ was a way for the opposition parties to survive in the new single-seat constituency system (Hiwatari and Saito 2011).

The second characteristic is sectionalism which was particularly obvious in the

---

[7] Interview with Kenichi Suzuki, Assistant General Manager, Election Campaign Committee (at the time of the 2009 election), 23 February, 2012.

[8] In April 1998, four parties, including the ex-DPJ initiated in 1996, formed the DPJ. The former prime minister, Tsutomu Hata, Yukio Hatoyama, later the first prime minister of the DPJ government, and Naoto Kan, the second prime minister of the DPJ government, were amongst those who took the initiative to form a new party. Then in September 2003, it merged with the Liberal Party, led by Ichiro Ozawa.

process of drafting the manifesto. Even though the party became centralised when it finalised the manifesto, it tended to be divided into groups. Such sectionalism can be seen in the policy research unit at the party headquarters, which is composed of a number of *bukai* (committees). *Bukai* are devoted to each policy area and each *bukai* is in charge of drafting a particular policy for the manifesto. The members of the opposition cabinet, the equivalent of the shadow cabinet in the UK, head each *bukai*. The sectionalism of each *bukai* is so strong that the overall coordination of policies, which is supposed to be conducted by a 'project team', often achieves little.

When the manifesto is finalised, the policies developed by the *bukai* are re-examined at the final stage only by the party leader and the leading members of the opposition cabinet. Since the rules of the DPJ do not require resolution for the manifesto at the party conference, it is possible for the party leader to arrange the manifesto almost entirely at his/her discretion. Before the 2009 manifesto, Yukio Hatoyama, the successor of Ozawa along with a few leading spokesmen and their advisers, worked on the final version of the manifesto, thus excluding other members of the party.

Thirdly, the constituency parties of the DPJ are limited in numbers and not well developed as organisation. The members of the party and their 'supporters' (associate members), number approximately 250,000, around one third of that of the LDP[9]. Under such circumstances, the policy making took place exclusively at the party headquarters.

4. The Policy-making process of child allowance: a way towards a 'passive' basic income

The 2009 manifesto of the DPJ, *Putting People's Lives First,* offered a variety of generous cash distributions such as child allowance, income guarantees to farmers, and free tuition fees for all high school students through subsidies. In contrast, it placed less emphasis on service provision compared to its 2005 manifesto (DPJ 2005; 2009). To examine the policy-making process of the 2009 manifesto, I shall particularly focus on the policy process of child allowance since it was the key policy that the DPJ prioritised during the election campaign.

As mentioned above, in the 2005 manifesto, the DPJ, led by Katsuya Okada, offered public-funded universal child benefits of ¥16,000 (equivalent to $106; $1=¥150) per month for each child aged under 16. Child allowance and other cash distributions were closely linked with extensive service provisions and policies to create jobs. Therefore, the child allowance proposed in the 2005 manifesto can be placed in the context of activation. At this point, the party goal of the DPJ was a mixture of vote seeking and policy seeking. For the former, it tried to be responsive to voters' demands to reform the conventional livelihood system. For the latter, it offered a set of policy alternatives that the future government would pursue.

When Ozawa became the leader of the DPJ in March 2006, he changed the direction of

---

[9] Therefore, particularly during the election campaign in 2009, Ozawa was desperate to assure the support of Rengo, the national centre of trade unions with about 6.8 million members.

the policy design. Before the 2007 election for the upper house, Ozawa announced in Diet that the DPJ would raise the amount of proposed universal child allowance from ¥16,000 to ¥26,000. If implemented, the amount of child allowance in Japan would be more than double the equivalent in Sweden. With no prior consultation with the members of the opposition cabinet or the relevant *bukai*, the revised child allowance suddenly became a flagship policy of the party.

Since the previous figure of the allowance, ¥16,000, was based on the exact amount of the tax exemption, which was to be abolished when the child allowance was introduced, the sudden increase shocked the party. Worse still, due to the absence of institutional settings to support the opposition leaders to prepare for the government, it is assumed that the leader's office was not able to examine the validity of the renewed amount of child allowance. Neither leader nor the members of the opposition cabinet received proper information from senior officials. Furthermore, they did not have enough funding to investigate these policies. Without knowing the practical details of the government machinery, the party became rather too optimistic about implementing its manifesto. Indeed, Ozawa, while in opposition, unequivocally asserted that there would be plenty of money in the government.

Ozawa's intention through the change in child allowance was to reach the voters in rural areas, most of whom were traditional LDP supporters. In doing so, he attempted to make the policies fit the traditional lifestyles of these people, which was based on familialism (Miura 2011: 44). Accordingly, Ozawa even offered an allowance to reward households that supported their old parents, which was not included in the 2009 manifesto. As discussed above, the centralised system of the policy-making system enabled Ozawa to shift the policy position at will. At this time, the DPJ under Ozawa's leadership, redefined its party goal from policy seeking to vote seeking.

Led by this goal, the central idea of the 2009 manifesto was the expansion of generous cash distribution, such as a guaranteed minimum pension, income support for each farming household, and the universal child allowance with an increased amount. In other words, it was a shift to the idea of a sort of a 'passive' basic income without active policies to improve people's employabilities (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: The Policy Position of the DPJ, in 2005 and 2009

After the DPJ took office in 2009, the policy change made right before the election caused much confusion within the government. The LDP, which had lost office, fiercely attacked the child allowance as a dole-out policy, and it insisted on attaching a means test for the higher-income people. Not only the opposition parties, but also the coalition partners and the members of the DPJ, including Ozawa himself, argued against universalism. Under the system of bicameralism, the dissent expressed from the coalition partners could have been an obstacle for the DPJ to implement policies as it wished. However, in the case of the DPJ, an intra-party policy-making system mattered more. The point was that within the DPJ there was a serious lack of shared vision and logic underlying the manifesto. This made the DPJ even more vulnerable to defend the legitimacy of its policies.

Such a lack of consensus within the party was caused by three factors: the fragmented structure of the party drawn from its origin, the sectionalism of the *bukai*, and the highly centralised system of policy making without a procedure on which to build consensus across the party, particularly at the last stage of completing the manifesto. The division within the party severely limited the ability of the leader to put policies presented in the manifesto into practice. Consequently, the stance of the coalition government became inconsistent with the policies and ideas proposed in the manifesto. Worse still, after it lost the 2010 election for the upper house, which led once again to a 'twisted parliament' again, it was forced to make concessions to the opposition.

To summarise, before the 2009 election, the DPJ shifted its policy position from

activation to a 'passive' basic income. Under its centralised policy-making system, Ozawa initiated and controlled the significant shift in the direction of the party. Through this change, Ozawa redefined the party goal as vote seeking at the expense of policy seeking. However, the idea of a 'passive' basic income as presented in the manifesto had its weak points. Namely, the new coalition government led by the DPJ was frequently challenged by the shortage of funding and had much difficulty in putting its election pledges into practice. This was at least partially caused by the lack of information it received before taking office. Furthermore, because the manifesto was created without intra-party consultation, after it had taken office, the party was neither able to have a cohesive voice nor to take a policy position that was consistent with the manifesto.

V.   Conclusion

This paper has examined how the power resources provided for the party leadership and the intra-party decision-making system, both of which were set during the years in opposition, define the strength of the political leadership once in office. By comparing the British Labour Party with the DPJ, the paper has argued firstly that institutional settings, which were arranged to support the opposition leaders, such as a communication channel with senior civil servants and public financial aid can increase the power resources of the party leadership. By mobilising these resources, Blair was able to prepare a feasible manifesto that could be implemented as soon as he took office. In contrast, the DPJ had to prepare the manifesto with hardly any institutional settings to support the power transition. Consequently, after inauguration, the coalition government led by the DPJ suddenly faced a severe shortage of fiscal capacity to implement its election pledges.

Secondly, both parties had centralised systems of decision-making. This enabled the leaders to identify the party goals more or less at their discretion. Blair, Ozawa and then Hatoyama, the then-party leaders, made decisions about the direction of their party. The leaders prioritised vote maximisation at the expense of policy seeking as party goals just before the election. Both parties won the election by a landslide. After inauguration, for the Labour government, the centralised decision-making system eased the way to implement, most of its manifesto. The procedure to build a consensus, at least officially, helped establish the legitimacy of its manifesto. In stark contrast, the DPJ, although it turned some pledges into policies, faced division within the party which shook the ground of the leader. It soon emerged that the centralised system of the decision making established in the process of finalising the manifesto was merely temporary. In additon, because the DPJ did not have a procedure to reach a broad consensus on the manifesto, such as through a resolution of party conference, many party members found hardly any legitimacy in its manifesto.

At the same time, I would conclude that the policy designs drawn from vote-seeking goals have profound effects on the policy development after the party takes office. For the Labour Party, the 'policy of no change', which Blair decided behind closed doors

before the election, led the party to narrow down its policy objectives, and to exclude some radical reforms. Even other radical reforms had to be achieved 'by stealth'. For the DPJ, a 'passive' basic income policy, which Ozawa had chosen, was too vulnerable to be defended when the government could not overcome the revenue shortfalls.

Fundamentally, what matters in a parliamentary democracy is the opposition as a credible alternative government. The institutional settings that support the leaders of opposition parties and the intra-party decision-making system define, to a great extent, the credibility of the government.

References

The Guardian
The Financial Times
The Observer
The Sun

Aerschot, Paul Van 2011. *Activation Policies and the Protection of Individual Rights: A Critical Assessment of the Situation in Denmark, Finland and Sweden,* Surrey: Ashgate.

Annesley, Claire and Andrew Gamble 2004. 'Economic and Welfare Policy', in Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith (eds.), *Governing as New Labour: Policy and Politics under Blair,* London: Palgrave.

Ashdown, Paddy 2000. *The Ashdown Diaries: Volume 1, 1988-1997,* London: Penguin Books.

Bara, Judith and Ian Budge 2001. 'Party Policy and Ideology: Still New Labour?' *Parliamentary Affairs,* 54, pp.590-606.

Blair, Tony 1996. 'Press Release, Rt. Hon. Tony Blair MP, Leader of the Labour Party at a Press Conference, to launch "Road to the Manifesto" ', Wednesday 27 March, 1996, the Labour Party Media Office.

Bower, Tom 2005. *Gordon Brown,* London: Harper Pernnial.

Brown, Gordon 1996. 'Statement by Gordon Brown MP, Shadow Chancellor', Wednesday 27 March, 1996, the Labour Party Media Office.

Campbell, Alastair and Richard Scott (eds.) 2008. *The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries,* London: Hutchinson.

Commission on Social Justice 1994. *Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal,* London: Vintage.

Dahl, A. Robert 1966. 'Epilogue', in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Finley, Moses I. 1985. *Democracy: Ancient and Modern,* London: Hogarth Press.

Gould, Philip 1999. *Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party,* London: Abacus.

Helms, Ludger 2008. 'Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues and Perspectives', *Journal of Legislative Studies,* 14(1/2), pp.6-19.

Hiwatari, Norihiro and Jun Saito (eds.) 2011. *Turmoil in Party Politics and Government Alternation,* Tokyo: Tokyo University Press (in Japanese)〔樋渡展洋・齋藤淳　2011年　『政党政治の混迷と政権交代』、東京：東京大学出版会〕.

Imai, Takako 2011a. 'Organisational Reforms of the Opposition and Alternation of Government' *Seikei Hogaku,* 74, pp.45-72 (in Japanese)〔今井貴子　2011a年　「野党の組織改革と政権交代――イギリス労働党の党内資料の分析（1994－1997年）」、『成蹊法学』第74号、45-72頁〕.

_____ 2011b. 'A Perspective on Inclusion', *Studies of Consumer Cooperatives (Seikatsu Kyodo Kumiai Kenkyu),* 431, pp.41-49 (in Japanese)〔今井貴子　2011b年　「包摂のゆくえ――政権交代後のイギリスにかんする一考察」、『生活協同組合研究』Vol. 431、41-49頁〕.

Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs 2008. *Japan: An International Comparison* 2009, Tokyo: Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs.

Jones, Nicholas 1997. *Campaign 1997,* London: Indigo.

Kaiser, André 2008. 'Parliamentary Opposition in Westminster Democracies: Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand', *Journal of Legislative Studies,* 14(1/2), pp.20-45.

Keegan, William 2005. *The Prudence of Mr Gordon Brown,* London: John Wiley & Sons.

Kelly, Richard 2011. *Short Money,* SN/PC/1663, Parliament and Constitution Centre, London: House of Commons Library.

King, Anthony 1992. 'The Implications of One-Party Government', in Anthony King et al. (eds), *Britain at the Polls, 1992,* Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House.

Labour Party 1995. *A New Economic Future for Britain: Economic and Employment Opportunities for All,* July 1995.

_____ 1996. *New Labour New Britain, Road to the Manifesto,* Draft manifesto.

Miura, Mari 2011. 'Will The DPJ Get Over the "Stray without the Governing": A New Growth Strategy and Child Allowance', in Research Institute For Advancement Of Living Standards (ed.), *Policies and Decision-Making System of the DPJ Government,* Souken Booklet, No. 6〔三浦まり 2011年　「民主党は『統治なき迷走』を脱するか？――新成長戦略と子ども手当」、（財）連合総合生活開発研究所『民主党政権の政策と決定システム――鳩山内閣期を中心に』、連合総研ブックレット、No. 6〕.

Nonaka, Naoto 2011. 'The Parties: Towards New Missions and Competition' in Takeshi Sasaki et al. (eds.), *Contemporary Japanese Politics,* Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Publisher (in Japanese)〔野中尚人　2011年　「政党――新たな使命と競争へ」、佐々木毅・清水真人編著『ゼミナール現代日本政治』、東京：日本経済新聞出版社〕.

OECD 2007. *Employment Outlook,* Paris: OECD.

_____ 2008. *Employment Outlook,* Paris: OECD.

Osawa, Mari 2011. *Social Security in Contemporary Japan,* London: Routledge.

Peck, Jamie 2001. *Workfare States,* London: Guilford Press.

Quinn, Thomas 2004. *Modernising Labour Party: Organisational Change since 1983,* London: Palgrave.

Richards, David 2009. 'Sustaining the Westminster Model: A Case Study of the Transition in Power between Political Parties in British Government', *Parliamentary Affairs,* 62(1), pp.108-128.

Rhodes, Martin 2000. 'Restructuring the British Welfare State: Between Domestic Constraints and Global Imperatives', in Fritz W. Sharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt (eds.), *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy,* Volume II, *Diverse Responses to Common Challenges,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Riddell, Peter and Catherine Haddon 2009. *Transitions: Preparing for Changes of Government,* London: Institute for Government.

Seldon, Anthony 2004. *Blair,* London: Free Press.

Short, Clare 2005. *An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power,* London: Free Press.

Strøm, Kaare and Wolfgang C. Müller 1999. 'Political Parties and Hard Choices' in Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller (eds.), *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Miyamoto, Taro 2003. 'Dynamics of the Japanese Welfare State in Comparative Perspective: Between "Three Worlds" and the Developmental State', *Japanese Journal of Social Security Policy,* 2(2), pp.12-24.

_____ 2006. 'Governance of the Post Welfare State: A New Political Contests', *Shiso,* 983, Tokyo: Iwanami (in Japanese)〔宮本太郎　2006年　「ポスト福祉国家のガバナンス──新しい政治対抗」、『思想（福祉社会の未来）』No.983、東京：岩波書店〕.

Weaver, R. Kent 1986. 'The Politics of Blame Avoidance', *Journal of Public Policy,* 6(4), pp. 371-398.

Yamaguchi, Jiro and Taro Miyamoto 2008. 'What Social and Economic System Do the Japanese People Wish?', *Sekai,* March (in Japanese)〔山口二郎・宮本太郎　2008年　「日本人はどのような社会経済システムを望んでいるのか」、『世界』2008年3月号〕.